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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to review current debate about the moral domain in the moral 
psychological literature. There is some vagueness in respect to the usage of the very concept of ‘morality’. 
This conceptual problem recently has been re-addressed by several authors. So far, there is little 
agreement, nobody seems to agree about how to delineate the moral domain from other ‘non-moral’ 
normative domains. Currently, there are several positions that disagree about the scope of morality, 
ranging from complete monists to complete pluralists. The paper will review these positions and will 
tentatively suggest further directions to test their claims. At this moment, there is no decisive evidence 
for either position. 
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1. Introduction
Historically, Western moral philosophy has 
addressed not only the normative question 
of how rational agents ought to behave, 
but also how ordinary people actually are 
behaving. The latter descriptive project, 
by and large, was limited to the philoso-
pher’s own observations and intuitions. 
More recently, this descriptive project was 
supplemented, if not dominated, by social 
scientific methods. More specifically, a de-
scriptive moral psychology slowly devel-
oped as an independent sub-discipline that 
covers a wide range of research programs, 
topics and methods (see, for instance, 
Sinnott-Armstrong 2008; and Doris 2010; 
also, for a review of more recent develop-
ment of experimental moral philosophy 
see Alfano and Loeb 2014). 
For the most part, contemporary moral 
psychology concentrates on different types 
of moral judgments. In particular, psychol-
ogists are interested in everyday judgments 
about various socially relevant actions and 
agents performing those actions. On the 
one hand, a good deal of research focusses 
on judgments of actions as wrong, that is, 
actions as transgressions (e.g., Haidt 2012, 
or Gray et al. 2012). Very often such re-
search assumes that a folk judgment of 
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wrongness, and, especially in such cases 
as harmful actions, is tantamount to a folk 
moral judgment. On the other hand, some 
research has focussed on judgments of 
agents as blameworthy (e.g., Malle et al. 
2014). Blame judgment, according to this 
line of research, is a kind of second order 
moral judgment because, first, it involves a 
negative event that is perceived to be mor-
ally wrong (first order moral judgment) 
and, second, it requires information about 
an agent’s causal relatedness, intentions, 
beliefs and obligations. Interestingly, typi-
cal cases that were used in those studies in-
volved harmful actions or outcomes, while 
other types of scenarios were less frequent. 
By studying wrongness and blame 
judgments, moral psychologists not only 
tried to map the structure of explicit folk 
moral concepts, but also theorized about 
implicit psychological mechanisms that 
produce those judgments. An important 
distinction in this regard is between moral 
intuitions and moral reasoning. For in-
stance, some have posited that there are 
two cognitive systems that quite differ-
ently subserve moral judgments (e.g., 
Cushman et al. 2010). System one is au-
tomatic, fast and is rooted in emotions 
and/or cognitive heuristics. This is when 
we intuitively disapprove or approve of 
some action, or when react very fast in 
some situation. System two is slow and 
involves conscious, deliberate reasoning 
and an application of moral principals or 
rules. Some, following in steps of David 
Hume (1740/2003), argue that moral rea-
soning kicks in only to justify or rational-
ize what moral intuitions already ‘decided’ 
(e.g., Haidt, 2001; Nichols 2002). Whereas 
others, following the tradition of utilitarian 
cost-and-benefit considerations, argue that 
there is more to moral reasoning than just 
post hoc rationalization (e.g., Cushman et 
al. 2006, Royzman et al. 2011). 
Still, despite a wide range of research 
programs, there was some vagueness in 
respect to the usage of the very concept of 
morality, it was not properly defined and 
characterized. Incidentally, the above re-
search programs tacitly equated the moral 
domain with harm, at least most of the 
studies used harm related scenarios. A no-
table exception, however, was Elliot Turiel 
and his so called “moral/conventional 
task” (1983). More recently, this concep-
tual problem was re-addressed by several 
research groups and is now thoroughly 
discussed in papers and conferences. Not 
surprisingly, so far there is little agreement 
among the participants of this debate. In 
particular, even if everyone would agree 
that moral judgment is a certain kind of 
normative judgment, nobody seems to 
agree about how to delineate the ‘moral’ 
from other ‘non-moral’ normative judg-
ments – that is, how to delineate the moral 
domain in general. 
The main aim of this paper is to review 
recent moral psychological literature that 
explicitly considers the moral domain (for 
the review of philosophical attempts to 
define morality see Gert 2011). To begin 
with, it should be noted that in the current 
literature, while delineating the moral do-
main, the term ‘moral’ has been used in 
two basic senses (see Sousa and Piazza 
2014). In one sense, the emphasis is on a 
type of normative content – for instance, 
people consider a normative transgression 
as a moral transgression only if it involves 
harmful actions (where perceived harm 
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operates as a specific normative content). 
In another sense, the emphasis is on a spe-
cific type of normative conviction – that is, 
moral transgressions evoke a strong evalu-
ative conviction that an action is wrong, 
no matter what is the normative content. 
Importantly, there is little agreement on 
what counts as a relevant normative con-
tent, and how to characterize the strong 
normative conviction in moral judgments. 
In other words, what distinguishes moral 
judgments from other kinds of normative 
judgments? Note, however, the two basic 
senses are not entirely separated, it seems 
that most researchers try to delineated the 
moral domain (as opposed to other nor-
mative domains) solely in terms of nor-
mative content, while some try to specify 
the normative content qua moral domain 
with normative conviction. Indeed, there 
is some vagueness in the literature in this 
regard, therefore, in this review I’ll keep 
those two senses separate and where nec-
essary indicate their connections. 
2. Turiel’s moral-conventional  
distinction
At the outset, I would like to sketch a rel-
evant historical background. In particular, 
I will briefly present the Turiel tradition in 
moral psychology that was widely influ-
ential and is an important reference point 
for contemporary debate concerning the 
moral domain. It is a good starting point 
since almost all participants of the current 
debate refer to this tradition in one way 
or another, either by criticizing or by de-
fending it (e.g., for criticism see Kelly et 
al. 2007; and for responses to the criticism 
see Sousa 2009; Sousa et al. 2010). 
Turiel and his colleagues delimited 
the moral domain in opposition to non-
moral conventional domains (Nucci 2001; 
Nucci and Turiel, 1978; Tisak and Turiel 
1984; Smetana 1981; Turiel 1983; Yau and 
Smetana 2003; and later adopted by Blair 
1995; and Nichols 2004). According to 
this tradition, folk intuitions (of children 
and adults alike) systematically distin-
guish between moral transgressions (e.g., 
hitting other people, stealing or cheating) 
and conventional transgressions (e.g., eat-
ing with your bare hands or dressing inap-
propriately to school). This distinction, it 
is argued, is a rather robust psychological 
phenomenon that could be observed across 
different age groups and across different 
cultural or religious contexts (e.g., Nucci 
and Turiel 1993; Yau and Smetana 2003). 
The former conclusion was supported by 
numerous empirical data that heavily re-
lied on various versions of the so-called 
moral/conventional task. In particular, Tu-
riel tradition postulated a cluster of inter-
related conceptual elements that can be 
reliably activated by a specified question-
naire. Thus, following Sousa’s (2009) gen-
eral characterization, we could summarize 
those conceptual elements in this way:
(1) type of action: moral transgres-
sions involve a victim being 
harmed and/or subjected to injus-
tice; while conventional transgres-
sions do not. 
(2) permissibility: moral transgres-
sions are less permissible than 
conventional transgressions.
(3) seriousness: moral transgressions 
are more serious than convention-
al transgressions.
(4) authority independence: moral 
transgressions are seen as author-
ity independent (i.e., their wrong-
ness is not cancelable by the de-
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cision of any authority); while 
conventional transgressions de-
pend on authority.
(5) generality of scope: moral trans-
gressions are general in scope 
(i.e., their wrongness extends to 
different places and times); while 
conventional transgressions are 
seen as local in scope.
In a typical moral/conventional task 
people are presented with a prototypical 
moral transgression scenario, then they 
have to respond to the subsequent ques-
tions that probe all the aforementioned 
(1)-(5) conceptual elements. If participants 
exhibit the ‘signature moral pattern’ (Kel-
ly et al. 2007), i.e., they evoke all (1)-(5) 
conceptual elements, then we have a case 
of a moral judgment. If some conceptual 
element is not evoked, then, by definition, 
we have a case of a non-moral normative 
conventional judgment. As Kelly et al. 
note (see also Sousa 2009), this signature 
response pattern forms a kind of ‘nomo-
logical cluster’ – a law-like tendency for 
(1)-(5) conceptual elements to co-occur. 
Of course, later studies questioned such a 
conclusion (e.g., Haidt et al. 1993; Kelly 
et al. 2007; Shweder, et al. 1997). And it 
seems that the gist of all criticism is due 
to (1) – the requirement  that, among other 
things, a genuine moral judgment should 
involve the concepts of harm and/or in-
justice (for a more recent debate about the 
morality of harm and injustice see Kelly 
et al. 2007, Sousa 2009; Sousa et al. 2010; 
Sousa and Piazza 2014; Stich et al. 2009; 
Quintelier et al. 2012). What is impor-
tant to note here, however, is the fact that 
(1) refers to the normative content (as it 
was mentioned in introduction), whereas 
(2)-(5) refer to normative conviction. In 
this respect, critics say, Turiel’s definition 
of morality is unduly narrow, it specifies 
the necessary normative content (say H, 
for harm) and characterizes the normative 
conviction (say MS, for moral signature). 
Thus, the prediction of the researchers in 
the Turiel tradition would be as follows: if 
participants will judge that a transgression 
involves H, then they will evoke MS (see 
also Sousa 2009). So, to sum up, in Turiel 
tradition the scope of the moral domain is 
delineated by the normative content (1), 
while the normative content qua moral do-
main is specified by normative conviction 
(2)-(5).
However, such a conceptual connec-
tion (in a law-like manner) was criticized. 
In the next section I will review some of 
the criticism.
3. Debating the moral domain 
As it was mentioned, Turiel and his col-
leagues have argued that harmful trans-
gressions and injustice transgressions are 
two basic types of normative content that 
constitute the moral domain1. Important-
ly, the Turiel tradition emphasized that a 
transgression should involve Harm and/or 
Injustice in order to count as a moral trans-
gression (in contrast to mere conventional 
1  It should be noted that in the literature the gen-
eral term of ‘moral domain’ is sometimes used in plural. 
Plural usage indicates that there are different instances 
of the category ‘moral domain’. For instance, Harm and 
Injustice are two distinct moral domains in this sense, 
e.i., two instances of the same category ‘moral domain’. 
In this paper, in order to avoid confusions, I will use the 
term ‘moral domain’ only to indicate a category, while 
particular instances will be labeled as particular types of 
normative content (or conviction) within the category 
‘moral domain’. 
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transgression). Currently, there are several 
positions that disagree about the scope of 
morality, ranging from complete monists 
to complete pluralists.2 Most of these po-
sitions put a strong emphasis on different 
types of the normative content as a way to 
demarcate the moral domain.
3.1. Pluralists: arguing for a broader 
scope of normative content
I will begin with pluralists since this group 
of moral psychologists came as an explicit 
opposition to Kohlberg’s (e.g., Kohlberg 
and Hersh 1977) and Turiel’s outlined 
narrow notion of morality – a tradition 
that dominated moral psychology since 
60-ties. More specifically, the critique 
came from cultural psychologists such as 
Shweder and his colleagues (for review 
see Shweder et al. 1997). Based on re-
search in India, they argued that in other 
cultures, people tend to moralize allegedly 
conventional domains, for example, it is 
highly immoral for a Brahman’s son to eat 
meat or cut his hair during the 10 days that 
follow the death of his father (Shweder 
2  A clarification is in order. Contemporary monists 
and pluralists agree that there is such a thing as moral 
domain (broadly construed) – a separate and psycho-
logically realistic domain of normative cognition, as 
opposed to non-moral normative domains. This basic 
assumption is not disputed by neither of them. How-
ever, there is a position arguing that perhaps there is 
no separate moral domain with special psychological 
characteristics, i.e., moral norms  are not a natural kind 
(Kelly and Stich 2007; Sripada and Stich 2006; for dis-
cussion see also Machery and Mallon 2010). Instead, 
these relativists hypothesize, there is a general norma-
tive psychology and only via social learning we acquire 
culturally specific norms of conduct, even such norms 
as prohibition to harm or act fairly in cooperative ven-
tures (e.g., Henrich and Henrich, 2007). In other words, 
culture determines what is moral and what is not, if such 
a concept is ever used by particular groups. 
and Haidt 1993). Shweder argued that Tu-
riel’s definition of morality is applicable 
only to the ethics of autonomy (concerns 
about harm, and justice), but there are also 
ethics of community (concerns about du-
ties to the group), and divinity (concerns 
about purity and sanctity). Following this 
work, Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues 
later developed a so-called Moral Founda-
tions Theory – a contemporary incarnation 
of moral pluralism. Initially, Haidt sought 
to demonstrate that harm-based moral-
ity (understood broadly as encompassing 
physical/psychological harm, injustice and 
violations of rights) is not the only kind of 
morally relevant domain in different cul-
tures and different socio-economic groups 
(Haidt et al. 1993). More specifically, he 
conducted a study among Americans and 
Brazilians of high and low socio-econom-
ic status. In this study, he investigated the 
tendency to moralize harmless offenses by 
presenting to participants rather provoca-
tive scenarios, for instance: describing 
a woman who is cleaning a toilet with a 
national flag, consensual sex between sib-
lings or eating one’s own pet dog. Impor-
tantly, Haidt followed only some aspects 
of the Turiel’s method (e.g., he included 
universality question, but did not included 
the question about authority independ-
ence), also, he included a Harm probe to 
check whether participants perceived any 
harm in those allegedly harmless sce-
narios (for details see Haidt et al. 1993). 
Haidt found that “Harm is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient as a marker of moral is-
sues” (ibid.: 626) for Brazilians and lower 
socio-economic status Americans. This is 
considered as evidence against Kohlberg’s 
and Turiel’s type of monism (i.e., that all 
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morality stems from harm and justice con-
siderations).
On the bases of this research and other 
accounts from cultural psychology and an-
thropology, Haidt and his colleagues later 
developed a thoroughly pluralistic account 
of morality. They argued that there are 
at least five moral domains, comprising 
transgressions related to concerns about 
(1) care/harm, (2) fairness/cheating, (3) 
loyalty/betrayal, (4) authority/subversion, 
and (5) sanctity/degradation (Haidt and 
Graham, 2007; for a recent theoretical 
review see Graham et al. 2013; see also 
Haidt 2012; for other pluralistic propos-
als see Rai and Fiske 2011; Sinnott-Arm-
strong and Wheatley 2012 ). All these five 
domains are partly constituted by innate 
and functionally specialized psychologi-
cal mechanisms that have evolved to deal 
with specific social or natural challenges. 
Different cultures, in this respect, differ-
ently re-work ‘the first draft of the moral 
mind’ (Haidt and Graham, 2007). That is, 
even if there are common moral founda-
tions, still, the final product is culturally 
diverse moral systems, simply because 
different cultures emphasize different nor-
mative contents. It should be noted, how-
ever, that recently developed pluralistic 
Moral Foundations Theory relies on differ-
ent methods. That is, instead of following 
Haidt’s original method (which followed 
Turiel’s method), they now constructed 
a new Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
(MFQ). MFQ assumes that there are five 
independent normative contents in the 
moral domain and constructs five types of 
questions to probe all of them. This way 
Haidt and colleagues expect to elicit sys-
tematic responses of different cultural, 
socio-economic and demographic groups. 
MFQ does not try to prove that there are 
five different normative contents, it simply 
provides “a reliable, valid, and easy-to-use 
tool for exploring this expanded moral do-
main” (Graham,  et al. 2011: 382). How-
ever, contemporary monists do not agree 
with this assumption, they believe that it is 
possible to account for such a moral diver-
sity by assuming less. 
3.2. Monists: arguing for a narrower 
scope of normative content
The aforementioned pluralists criticized 
Kohlberg and Turiel as monists (though 
Turiel separated harmful and injustice 
transgressions), who tried to reduce all 
morally relevant concerns to the ethics of 
autonomy. Interestingly, Turiel responded 
to this criticism by pointing out that per-
haps there are other ways to interpret the 
evidence about allegedly harmless of-
fenses (a la Shweder and Haidt), it might 
be possible to re-describe those responses 
in terms of harm and fairness (Turiel et al. 
1987). Indeed, monists argue, we still need 
more evidence in order to rule out the re-
description strategy, the evidence should 
point out that other than Harm or Fairness 
normative contents are doing the real job 
(see also Fraser, 2012). Thus, in this con-
text, recent monists proposed new ways to 
conceptualize the moral domain. 
Currently, there are two types of mon-
ists: harm-based and fairness-based. I will 
start with the former. For instance, Gray 
and colleagues have argued that harmful 
transgressions constitute the basic moral 
domain, implying a completely monistic 
view of morality (for review see Gray et 
al. 2012). This conception of morality is 
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based on the mind perception research par-
adigm (e.g., Gray et al. 2007). They argue 
that “morality is essentially represented by 
a cognitive template that combines a per-
ceived intentional agent with a perceived 
suffering patient” (Gray et al. 2012: 102), 
and this moral dyadic template (intentional 
agent and suffering patient) is “a core fea-
ture of all immoral acts” (ibid.:107). More-
over, they argue that there are no harmless 
transgressions in folk moral cognition, 
simply because the dyadic template com-
pels “the mind to perceive victims even 
when they are objectively absent” (Gray 
et al. 2014: 1). Thus, on this account, os-
tensibly harmless transgressions (e.g., flag 
burning, family dog eating, consensual in-
cest) activate the concept of harm, whose 
normative content does the moralizing job. 
That is, all moral transgressions “should 
lead to the perception of harm” (ibid.: 3).
However, questioning the above harm-
based monistic position, Paulo Sousa and 
colleagues have argued for a deflationary 
view of the morality of harm. They argued 
that, conceptually speaking, harmful trans-
gressions evoke the relevant normative 
conviction (i.e., a conviction that an ac-
tion is wrong objectively and universally) 
if and only if they are seen as involving 
injustice (see Sousa 2009; Sousa et al. 
2009; Piazza et al. 2013; Sousa and Piazza 
2014). In other words, they have claimed 
that harmful transgressions qua moral 
transgressions are reducible to injustice 
transgressions. Note, not all harmful ac-
tions are transgressions (e.g., a dentist 
causing you pain because he wants to fix 
your teeth), only those harmful actions that 
involve basic-rights violation or injustice 
are categorized as moral transgressions 
(e.g. a dentist causing you pain because he 
wants to obtain your golden tooth). Simi-
larly, Sousa and colleagues hypothesized 
that perhaps other normative contents (a 
la Haidt) could be reduced to injustice 
considerations, although more evidence is 
needed to show that.
Finally, Baumard and colleagues have 
argued more radically that many of Haidt’s 
domains are not clearly seen as dissociated 
from the domain of fairness, which opens 
the possibility that these domains are mor-
alized only insofar as they involve fair-
ness considerations (Baumard et al. 2013; 
Sperber and Baumard 2012). This way, 
taken together, Sousa, Baumard and their 
colleagues suggest an alternative fairness-
based monistic view. More specifically, in 
their Behavioral & Brain Sciences target 
article, Baumard, Andre and Sperber brief-
ly addressed this questions by suggesting a 
broader (reductive) and a narrower (elimi-
native) approach to morality. According to 
the broader reductive approach, “in so far 
as [morally relevant] behaviors are mor-
alized, they are so because they are regu-
lated by considerations of fairness” (2013: 
110). According to the narrower approach 
“many norms, including some norms as-
sociated with a sense of rights or duties, 
are not moral norms” (ibid.). The narrower 
view appears to suggest that the notion of 
morality is a matter of terminological dis-
pute, one can carry on studying morality as 
it is defined and ignore other morally rele-
vant considerations. However, it seems that 
Baumard is willing to take on challenge and 
incorporate those other relevant considera-
tions, that is, he takes a broader reductive 
approach. Again, this is still very much an 
open empirical question, so far there is no 
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evidence to prove or to disprove this broad-
ly reductive approach to morality. 
3.3.  The role of normative  
conviction  
Recall, in Turiel tradition the scope of the 
moral domain is delineated by the ‘nomo-
logical cluster’ of conceptual elements, 
composed of normative content (1) that 
is specified by normative conviction (2)-
(5). As noted in Kelly et al. (2007), such a 
characterization seems to imply some kind 
of probabilistic law: if (1), then (2)-(5). 
However, as it was mentioned, the norma-
tive conviction can be dissociated from 
the normative content. This way, by refin-
ing Turiel’s traditional method, one could 
have a robust criteria to specify any kind 
of normative content as moral domain.     
To give an illustration of how particu-
lar normative conviction can specify nor-
mative content I will briefly present our 
current research (Berniūnas et al., manu-
script). Partly following Turiel’s method, 
we characterized the normative conviction 
specifying moral transgressions (e.g., the 
conviction that killing an innocent person 
is wrong) in contraposition to the norma-
tive conviction specifying conventional 
transgressions (e.g., the conviction that 
eating a meal with one’s fingers is wrong), 
in terms of two dimensions: while moral 
transgressions are seen as authority inde-
pendent (i.e., their wrongness is not can-
cellable by the decision of any authority) 
and general in scope (i.e., their wrongness 
extends to different places and times), 
conventional transgressions are seen as 
authority dependent and/or local in scope. 
From this perspective, the claim that there 
are different normative contents within the 
moral domain is tantamount to the claim 
that ordinary people can have the above 
strong normative conviction in relation to 
different types of normative contents.
Our research, with a revised version 
of the moral-conventional task, was con-
ducted in non-WEIRD context (Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democrat-
ic; see Henrich et al. 2010). Specifically, 
the study was conducted in Ulan Bator, the 
capital city of Mongolia. The results sug-
gest that Mongolians are inclined to moral-
ize all five Haidtian domains (Haidt 2012), 
which would constitute a cross-cultural ev-
idence in favor of moral pluralism. How-
ever, there is some evidence indicating 
that concerns about harm can be conceptu-
ally reduced to the concerns about fairness 
(a la Sousa and Piazza 2014). Interestingly, 
the strong reduction claim, as advocated 
by Baumard et al. (2013), does not seem 
to hold, as many participants moralized 
these remaining domains independently 
of a concern with fairness, although with 
some exceptions. Thus, there remain some 
unanswered questions and more evidence 
is needed. 
As this example illustrates, a clearly 
characterized normative conviction (call 
it “moral signature”) can help to deline-
ated the scope of moral domain. Indeed, 
in combination with cross-cultural sam-
ples, this criteria could help us map the 
moral domain in a more detailed manner. 
Of course, there could be alternative char-
acterizations of the normative conviction 
(see, for instance, Goodwin and Darley 
2008; and Tetlock 2003), but an underly-
ing intuition here seems to be the same – 
that to most people certain transgressions 
appear as intrinsically wrong.
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4. Conclusions 
The aim of this brief review was to sketch 
some basic conceptual disagreements be-
tween moral psychologists. On the one 
hand, researchers put a strong emphasis 
on the normative content while delineat-
ing the moral domain, and this seems to 
be the main source of all disagreements. 
On the other hand, some suggested to use 
additional psychological criteria to specify 
the moral domain, that is, the normative 
conviction, but this area is underdeveloped 
and requires more conceptual work. 
With these issues in mind, we have or-
ganized a conference at Vilnius University, 
9-11 October 2014: “The Moral Domain: 
Conceptual Issues in Moral Psychology”3. 
A modest expectation was to spell out 
some of the problems in defining ‘moral-
ity’ within moral psychological research. 
A somewhat optimistic expectation was to 
resolve at least some of the issues to the 
full satisfaction of the debating positions. 
For one, issues were not resolved, but the 
talks provided a stimulation, at least for 
me, to articulate some of the problems 
that should be further addressed in order 
to move on with our research. Of course, 
this is not an exhaustive list of issues, but 
a useful check-list for my own future em-
pirical work. 
First, the emic/etic perspective. It is 
worth mentioning that moral psychologists 
apply the term ‘moral’ in the context of 
folk normative judgments. Indeed, it is of-
ten assumed that folk judgment of wrong-
ness is a prima facia evidence of folk 
3  For more details, keynote speakers and partici-
pants see the conference website: http://moral-domain.
xphi.lt 
moral judgement. Here, it seems, research-
ers infer the concept of morality from peo-
ple’s responses. One important distinction 
coming from anthropology might be use-
ful here. Anthropologists make a distinc-
tion between emic and etic perspective, 
where the former implies a perspective of 
people themselves, i.e, words or concepts 
as they are conceived and used by people 
who are under investigation. Whereas an 
etic perspective implies concepts that are 
constructed and used by social scientist 
who study a particular group of people. 
Thus, it is not always clear whether moral 
psychologists draw this distinction in their 
studies. One thing is clear, ordinary people 
(non-philosophers or non-psychologists) 
don’t use the term ‘moral’ in the same 
way experts use. Moreover, it is also not 
so clear whether people imply the concept 
of morality (as it is understood by experts) 
when they make wrongness judgments. 
One reason to doubt that this the case is 
an astonishing lack of qualitative evidence 
from diverse cultural groups, something 
anthropologists routinely do (for an excel-
lent exception see Buchtel, manuscript). 
So it would be safe to assume that psy-
chologists, for the most part, have an etic 
perspective in mind when they study folk 
moral judgments. In future research, there-
fore, two levels of description (emic and 
etic) should be closely aligned. 
Second, explicit/implicit distinction. 
In the previous paragraph I have empha-
sized the need for the emic perspective, for 
qualitative evidence. But besides the pre-
vious methodological proposal we should 
also pay attention to distinction between 
explicit reports (as elicited by qualitative 
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methods) and implicitly held concepts and 
beliefs that are not necessarily consciously 
accessible. This level, thus, should still be 
studied with experimental tools, and this 
level is very important in current debate. 
Monists claim that explicit evidence of 
people’s responses is not enough to support 
a thoroughly pluralistic picture of morality. 
Baumard, for instance, argued that perhaps 
an implicit kind of evidence will prove (or 
disprove) his fairness-based monistic posi-
tion4. His theory assumes an evolved psy-
chology of fairness that, according to him, 
does all the moralizing job, but it’s work-
ings are bellow our conscious awareness. 
Third, I should stress again that a dis-
tinction between the normative content 
and the normative conviction should be 
explored in a more detailed manner. And 
finally, cross-cultural evidence – evidence 
that will eventually determine the contours 
of the moral domain.
4  From personal communication. 
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MORALĖS SRITIES APIBRĖŽIMAI MORALĖS PSICHOLOGIJOJE
Renatas Berniūnas
Santrauka. Straipsnio tikslas yra apžvelgti šiuolaikinę moralės psichologijos literatūrą, kurioje yra aptariama 
moralės sritis.  Šiuo metu psichologai nesutaria, kaip geriau apibrėžti moralės terminą ir kaip atskirti moralinę 
nuo nemoralinės normatyvinės srities. Šiais klausimais yra kelios prieštaraujančios pozicijos: psichologas 
Elliotas Turielis teigia, kad moralės pagrindą sudaro žalos ir teisingumo sąvokos, o monistai bando suvesti visą 
moralę tik į vieną – arba žalą, arba teisingumą. Galiausiai pliuralistai išskiria bent penkis moralės pagrindus. 
Straipsnis apžvelgs šias pozicijas ir pasiūlys galimus šių pozicijų teorinio pagrįstumo tikrinimo būdus.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: moralės sritis, moralės psichologija, normatyvinis pažinimas.
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